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Regulating Scotland’s Social Landlords:  
localised resistance to technologies of performance management  
 
Abstract 
Influenced by Foucault’s (2003a) later work on governmentality, this paper explores the 
regulation of social landlords as a ‘technology of performance’ (Dean 1999) concerned 
with governing the conduct of dispersed welfare agencies and the professionals within 
them.  This is a mode of power that is both voluntary and coercive; it seeks to realise its 
ambitions not through direct acts of intervention, but by promoting the responsible self-
governance of autonomous subjects (Rose 1999; Miller and Rose 2008). 
 Through an analysis of the regulatory framework for social landlords in Scotland, 
this paper highlights the creation of a performance culture that seeks to mobilise housing 
organisations to reconcile their local management systems and service provision to 
external standards, whilst simultaneously wielding punitive interventions for non-
compliance.   Housing professionals are not however passive in all of this, and indeed, 
actively challenged and resisted these top-down attempts to govern them at arms-length. 
 
Key Words: Foucault, governmentality, housing governance, power, social housing 
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Introduction 
The reconstruction of UK public services in recent years has resulted in the emergence of 
technologies of power concerned with scrutinising, evaluating and managing public 
sector performance (Rose and Miller 19992; Rose 1996, 1999; Dean 1999; Miller and 
Rose 2008).  A response to the increasing fragmentation of service providers as 
privatisation, quasi-market reforms and contracting out have gathered pace since the 
1980s, these techniques have been central to governing the activities of dispersed and 
autonomous welfare providers at arms-length.  Linked to managerialism, these new 
strategies and techniques aim to activate subjects’ sense of agency, and instead of direct 
line management, are characterised by a subtle interplay between self-regulation and 
external oversight (Clarke et al 2000; Newman 2001; Clarke 2005).   
 Social housing provides an ideal opportunity to explore these governance shifts.  
Since the 1980s its ownership and management has been transformed (Jacobs and Manzi 
2000; Walker 2000; Casey and Allen 2004).  New Public Management reforms designed 
to introduce a business ethos into the public sector have “externalised” the state’s 
provider role (Walker 2000: 286), resulting in the growth of the not-for-profit housing 
association sector, and simultaneous decline of publicly provided housing1 (Wilcox 
2007).  As the proportion of social housing under direct state control has decreased and 
the sector become increasingly diverse and complex, the need for new governing 
solutions has grown.  Drawing on the key concepts of governmentality this paper seeks to 
examine the arms-length regulation of social landlords in Scotland, with a particular 
focus on emergent ‘technologies of performance’ and sites of localised resistance.  The 
paper begins by outlining recent commentaries on advanced (or neo) liberal technologies 
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of governance, influenced by Foucault’s (2003a) governmentality.  This is followed by a 
consideration of the research methods used, and then a discussion of the policy 
background which links these governmental strategies and techniques to contemporary 
developments in the governance of UK social housing.  The substantive empirical section 
of the paper concludes that ‘technologies of performance’ management concerned with 
activating the responsible, self-governing properties of social landlords, have 
simultaneously resulted in the deployment of punitive interventions for organisations who 
fail to modify their performance accordingly; a situation that has been actively 
challenged, contested and resisted by front-line housing practitioners.  
 
Advanced Liberal Governance and the Regulation of Expertise 
Governmentality, a perspective on power and rule derived from the later work of Michel 
Foucault, has gained increasing popularity within housing studies in the last decade (see 
for example, Flint 2002, 2003; Flint and Rowlands 2003; Cowan and McDermont 2006; 
McKee 2008; McKee and Cooper 2008; McIntyre and McKee, In Press).  Applied by 
different authors in different ways, in its broadest sense governmentality draws attention 
to how we think about the nature and practice of government.  Foucault defines 
governing as the “conduct of conduct” (2003b: 138), which incorporates any calculated 
attempt to direct human behaviour towards particular ends.  By adopting such a broad 
meaning he emphasises that individuals are subject not only to domination by external 
actors, but are also active in their own government.  This older, more comprehensive 
meaning of government enables him to trace multiple sites of governing beyond the 
traditional boundaries of the state.  
4  
Governmentality has however been subject to critique.  The tendency of its 
proponents to draw on discursive as opposed to material practice for their evidence base 
has resulted in accusations that it is too abstract and detached from empirical reality 
(Clarke et al 2007; McKee, In Press).  Second, and related to the previous point, by 
focusing overwhelmingly on ‘mentalities’ of rule, governmentality studies have been 
guilty of neglecting the effects of power and the lived experience of subjection, as well as 
under-theorising localised resistance (Clarke et al 2007; McKee, In Press).  It has further 
been criticised for downplaying the role of the state, which continues to remain a 
powerful actor in shaping and regulating the social policies that govern all our lives 
(McKee 2008, In Press).  These limitations are not however insurmountable, and indeed, 
would be more accurately directed at secondary commentators who have interpreted 
Foucault’s ideas as opposed to fundamental failings with this perspective per se. 
In advanced liberal democracies, including the UK, post-Foucauldian 
commentators have highlighted the emergence of technologies of power which seek to 
construct a world of ‘free subjects’ by devolving both autonomy and responsibility from 
the state to a plethora of agents within civil society itself (Rose 1999).  Such freedom is 
however ambivalent, for whilst these technologies of power seek to mobilise and activate 
governable subjects, they also seek to cultivate and act upon the very operation of that 
freedom (Rose 1999; Flint 2003).  This is more akin to a form of regulated freedom than 
a reduction in government per se (Rose and Miller 1992).   
 Within UK welfare reform this emphasis on freedom and liberation has manifest 
itself in the emergence of  ‘technologies of agency’ (Dean 1999) which seek to empower 
individuals to act in their own-self interest, whether as informed consumers, active 
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citizens, or both.  The desire to combat powerlessness and passive dependency on the 
state has further manifested itself in a critique of welfare bureaucracies and professional 
expertise.  Here emergent ‘technologies of performance’ (Dean 1999) offer a means to 
open up these enclaves of expertise to external scrutiny, with audit emerging as a 
particularly powerful technique for evaluating performance and holding service providers 
to account (Rose and Miller 1992).  In general terms, audit refers to the evaluative 
processes concerned with inspecting and judging the performance of organisations.  It has 
been central to New Labour’s modernisation of public services post-1997, and has been 
posited as a solution to both addressing anxieties about producer capture and restoring 
public trust (Newman 2001; Power 2003; Clarke 2005).   
These ‘technologies of performance’ are not however dependent on direct acts of 
intervention; rather they realise their objectives through acting on the conduct of 
autonomous individuals (Dean 1999; see also, Foucault 2003b).  As Rose and Miller 
assert, these technologies of power have as their goal “influencing, allying with or co-
opting resources that they [authorities] do not directly control” (1992: 189).  This 
represents an important departure from traditional vertical command-and-control 
functions.  It is a strategy of government that operates at arms-length, and is both 
respectful of organisational autonomy and seeks to promote voluntary adherence to 
shared norms.  Whilst such developments seemingly devolve more power to front-line 
workers, they have also exposed welfare professionals to greater degrees of political 
interference (Rose 1999).  Not only have ‘technologies of performance’ rendered the 
conduct of professionals governable in new ways, but they have transformed the way in 
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which professionals themselves frame their judgements and decisions, a process which is 
increasingly constructed in terms of “goals, targets and measurements” (Rose 1996: 349).   
Yet governable subjects are not always “faithful relays” (Rose and Miller 1992: 
190).  Indeed, the ability of ‘the governed’ to contest top-down machinations is central to 
Foucauldian theories of power:  
 
The power relationship and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot therefore be 
separated.  The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude (how 
could we seek to be slaves?).  At the very heart of the power relationship, and 
constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of 
freedom.  Rather than speaking of an essential antagonism, it would be better to 
speak of ‘agonism’ of a relationship that is at the same time mutual incitement 
and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation that paralyzes both sides than a 
permanent provocation (Foucault 2003b: 139). 
 
 
The potential disjuncture between governmental ambitions and material reality is 
particularly significant within an applied policy context, where a key concern is the 
extent to which specific strategies and techniques have realised their political objectives  
(Clarke et al 2007; McKee, In Press).  It requires the analysis of discursive strategies be 
complemented with more ethnographic methods, and a strong focus given to the voices of 
those subject to governing practices – ambitions that are central to this paper. 
 In order to achieve this goal, and address a noted gap in the governmentality 
literature, the research develops an ‘ethnography of government’ (Li 2007).  In doing so, 
it reasserts Foucault’s commitment to understanding the unevenness of power’s 
effectivity, and the way in which subjects sometimes ‘refuse to know their place’ (Clarke 
2004).  The empirical data on which this paper is based is drawn from a broader study 
concerned with how housing governance has changed in Glasgow following its 2003 
housing stock transfer.  Fieldwork was undertaken between August 2005 and April 2006 
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and involved ethnographic case study research.  Selected case studies were drawn from 
Glasgow’s Local Housing Organisation (LHO) 2 community, and for comparison 
purposes also included a housing association operating outwith the Glasgow stock 
transfer context.  This neighbourhood-level phase was complemented by interviews with 
key-actors, including representatives from the Scottish Federation of Housing 
Associations, the housing regulator: Communities Scotland, Glasgow City Council and 
the Scottish Parliament. 
 Across both phases of the research 54 semi-structured interviews were held; 5 
tenant focus groups conducted with 36 participants; and a range of relevant 
meetings/events observed and key documents analysed.  The empirical data presented in 
this paper is primarily taken from interviews with housing practitioners at the local, 
citywide and national (Scotland) level, combined with analysis of key documents 
pertaining to regulation and inspection.  All case studies and individual participants have 
been anonymised for confidentiality purposes; this was essential given the political nature 
of the research topic.  Given the ethnographic focus of the research commitments have 
also been made to preserve local dialects, with the interviewer’s comments distinguished 
by italics (for further discussion of the research project, see McKee 2007).   
 
The Governance of Social Housing: managing performance 
Influenced by both new institutional economics and private-sector managerialism, 
consecutive UK governments since the 1980s have sought to address the perceived 
‘failings’ of public services through organisational and managerial restructuring – 
changes loosely referred to as the New Public Management (Hood 1991).  Paradoxically, 
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whilst this has involved the dispersal of state functions via market mechanisms it has also 
strengthened government control via performance management; the effect of which, has 
been a fundamental transformation in the regulatory relationship between the state and 
local welfare providers (Newman 2001; Clarke et al 2000; Clarke 2005).  
These governance shifts have impacted on the practices within housing 
organisations.  UK social housing has always been regulated housing (Cowan and 
McDermont 2006).  However, recent state led-led managerial reforms including Best 
Value (DETR 1998), have had a significant effect on the regulation of the sector.  
Paralleling trends in other welfare services, private sector principles have been imported 
into housing management.  The aim here has been to promote the 3 ‘E’s of economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness through regulatory tools such as performance indicators, 
benchmarking, best practice, competition and audit (Cowan and McDermont 2006).  
Whilst performance has been central to the governance of social landlords in the UK 
since the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering in the 1980s (Walker 2000), 
it has taken on a renewed focus as the distance between service providers and the 
bureaucracy of the welfare state has grown (Jacobs and Manzi 2000).   
Although the situation for local authority landlords varies across the UK, the 
current regulatory space for housing associations can be characterised as allowing for a 
significant degree of organisational autonomy, whilst having a strong enforcement arm in 
the form of cyclical inspections.  In this context, performance management operates 
through mechanisms of self-regulation as opposed to top-down prescription (Clarke et al 
2000; Clarke 2005).  Meeting external standards has now become a matter of local 
responsibility, with housing professionals expected to reconcile their service delivery and 
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management systems to shared norms, or else face the wrath of the housing regulator and 
potential withdrawal of financial support.   As Cowan and McDermont conclude:  
 
It is in the use of league tables, star ratings, and ‘naming and shaming’ that 
performance audit can be viewed as a tool for shaping public perceptions of what 
a service is about, as well as for hierarchical, disciplinary control (2006: 112). 
 
Whilst these regulatory techniques have been interpreted by housing officers as 
‘strategies of control’ that facilitate the top-down imposition of management values, 
research illuminates the inventiveness of front-line workers in circumventing these 
agendas for their own personal purposes (Jacobs and Manzi 2000).  The work of Casey 
and Allen (2004) further highlights how performance management can itself be 
appropriated by front-line workers, and in doing so, offer new opportunities to behave in 
a ‘professional’ manner.  Nonetheless the unintended consequences cannot be ignored: 
homogeneity, standardisation and the stifling of innovation.  As Jacobs and Manzi assert:  
 
A central paradox of the performance culture is that, whilst ostensibly seeking to 
enhance effectiveness, the implementation of PIs [performance indicators] in 
practice destabilizes managerial legitimacy (2000:100). 
 
By drawing on the key concepts of governmentality this paper seeks to advance 
the existing housing studies literature on regulation and performance management.   
Whilst this theoretical perspective undoubtedly has points of connection with the 
‘decentred regulation’ literature rooted in socio-legal studies and public policy (see for 
example, Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Power 2003), there are also important points of 
departure.  In particular, governmentality’s central focus on power, rule and resistance 
gives it a more critical and theoretical edge, whilst its broader definition of governing 
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facilitates an analysis of relations of power beyond the state, as well as the active role of 
the subject in their own self-governance.  The remainder of the paper uses empirical data 
about the regulation of social housing in Scotland to advance this theoretical perspective 
into new terrain. 
 
Regulating Performance: voluntary and coercive technologies of power  
The 2001 Housing (Scotland) Act introduced both a single regulatory framework and 
regulatory body: Communities Scotland, for all housing associations and local authority 
landlords in Scotland.  Since 2008, this function has been undertaken by the newly 
established and independent Scottish Housing Regulator.3   
Whilst the regulatory framework is comprised of a number of distinct elements its 
cornerstone is the creation and establishment of a performance culture within social 
housing provision.  Here, the Performance Standards for Social Landlords and 
Homelessness Functions (hereafter referred to as The Standards), which was published 
jointly by Communities Scotland, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities 
(COSLA), and the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (SFHA) in 2006, is 
pivotal.   As Table 1 summarises, The Standards are organised into 20 Guiding Standards 
and 33 Activity Standards.  Whilst the former are “underpinning principles” for the way 
in which social landlords should conduct their business, the latter focus on the main 
housing service activities that will be regulated and inspected (2006: 6).  
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Table 1 Performance Standards for Social Landlords and Homelessness Functions 
GUIDING STANDARDS 
(Underpinning principles) 
ACTIVITY STANDARDS 
(Outcomes to be inspected) 
Planning & 
Managing 
Performance 
• Planning and 
performance 
• Policies and procedures 
• Continuous 
improvement 
• Resource management 
• Procurement 
Housing 
Management 
• Access to housing 
• Lettings 
• Tenancies 
• Housing support needs 
• Void management 
• Rents 
• Service charges 
• Arrears 
• Antisocial behaviour 
• Estate management 
Social Inclusion • Equal opportunities 
• Tenant participation 
• Sustainability 
Property 
Management 
• Repairs 
• Stock management 
• Lifetime maintenance 
• Adaptations 
Service 
Delivery & 
Communication 
• Responsiveness to 
service users 
• Information and advice 
• Complaints and appeals 
• Performance reporting 
• Openness and 
confidentiality 
Property 
Development 
(Development 
Organisations) 
• Development strategy 
• Risk and value for 
money 
• Physical quality 
RSL 
Governance & 
Financial 
Management 
(RSLs) 
• Independence and 
accountability 
• RSLs in group 
structures 
• Leadership and 
capability 
• Risk management 
• Ethical standards 
• Financial viability 
• Financial management 
Homelessness 
(Dependent on 
housing strategy) 
• Strategy 
• Partnership working 
• Access 
• Prevention 
• Assessment process 
• Information and 
advice 
• Appeals 
• Quality of 
accommodation 
• Contract compliance 
• Accommodation 
provision 
Services for 
Owners 
• Sales 
• Factoring 
• Care and repair 
Services for 
Gypsies/ 
Travellers (Local 
Authority) 
• Sites 
Wider Role 
(RSLs) 
• Wider role 
involvement 
• Wider role outcomes 
Source: adapted from Communities Scotland, COSLA, SFHA (2006) “Performance Standards for Social 
Landlords and Homelessness Functions”.   
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 By setting out joint expectations in this way, The Standards provide both a 
baseline for evaluating performance and framework for self-assessment.  The expectation 
is that social landlords, and by default housing professionals, will self-critically reflect 
upon their own strengths and weaknesses and modify their internal management targets, 
policies and practices in order to comply with these criteria.  It is a mode of governance 
that seeks to promote the self-governing properties of autonomous agents; not obstruct 
them (Dean 1999; Rose 1999).  There are no rules governing how The Standards are to 
be achieved: they simply represent a reference point and spur to continual improvement 
in service provision: 
 
The Standards recognise that RSLs are independent, non-profit-distributing social 
businesses and that local authorities have their own democratic mandate and 
operating context […] [they] offer the opportunity to design and deliver services 
and manage their organisations as they think best while knowing clearly what 
they need to achieve. The Standards are set out at a high level and do not 
prescribe how landlords should go about their business. That is for each social 
landlord to consider and decide with its tenants and governing body or elected 
members (Communities Scotland et al 2006: 6).  
 
Instead of dictating to social landlords the detail of how they should be operating, 
organisations are encouraged to become self-aware about their own performance and to 
experiment locally with their service delivery.  Here benchmarking, the dissemination of 
good practice and joint working by learning from other agencies becomes important.  In 
this context it is difficult to separate the regulator from ‘the regulatees’, for all parties are 
involved in the joint development of norms of performance.  Regulation is therefore not 
solely a negative, repressive act: something ‘done to’ housing organisations.  Rather 
RSLs are intimately involved in the governance of social housing through their own 
capacity for critical self-assessment.  The ‘obscurity’ (Cowan and McDermont 2006) of 
13  
The Standards is crucial here, for their vagueness both enables a diversity of interests to 
coalesce around them and makes it more difficult to contest them.   
The ability of social landlords to deliver these performance standards is not 
however to be left to chance.  Rather it is to be ensured through a process of external 
audit, which in the Scottish housing context manifests itself in the cyclical inspection 
programme.  Coupled with The Standards, the inspection process comprises the other key 
arm of the housing regulatory regime.  As outlined by Communities Scotland (2007) 
Guide to Inspection, the Regulator is committed to inspecting every Scottish social 
landlord at least once in a five-year period.  The purpose of inspection is to 
comprehensively assess the achievement of individual social landlords in relation to The 
Standards and ensure compliance.  As one Inspector commented this was akin to “shining 
a mirror back on the organisation”, for it provides an external check and independent 
review of the organisation’s strengths and weaknesses.  A means of reassuring not only 
that public money is being well spent, but that customers are receiving good quality 
services.   
 
It [inspection] is a double edged sword in some ways for associations, it can be 
painful, it is a lot of work but it can tell them the areas they have maybe fallen 
down on and again does provide an external badge of approval (Policy Officer, 
SFHA). 
 
 Under the ever watchful gaze of the Regulator those organisations that fail to 
reconcile their internal targets to The Standards quickly become visible, and for those 
agencies that fail, or indeed refuse, to embrace the philosophy of responsible self-
government by reconciling their performance to external norms then more coercive 
measures are deployed.  As Table 2 highlights, the Regulator’s statutory powers of 
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intervention are significant and range from altering the personnel within the 
organisation’s governing body and senior staff, to compelling the organisation to transfer 
its assets to another social landlord.  Crucially, these powers of intervention differ 
according to whether the provider of services is an RSL or local authority.  The 
fragmentation of social housing provision and simultaneous growth of the housing 
association sector therefore subjects housing agencies to greater degrees of external 
scrutiny and intervention.   
 
 
Table 2 Type of Statutory Intervention 
Source: Communities Scotland (2004) “Intervention Strategy”.   
 
  
Despite the existence of these statutory powers of intervention, the Regulator 
concedes in its Intervention Strategy that it does not routinely expect to use them.  Instead 
The Standards are to be achieved by promoting the full and active involvement of ‘the 
governed’ through an emphasis on organisations themselves identifying and acting upon 
issues which may negatively affect their performance.  Indeed, the strategy states that no 
 
REGISTERED SOCIAL LANDLORD LOCAL AUTHORITY 
• Remove a member of the governing body • Instruct local authority to prepare 
remedial plan following inspection 
• Appoint a new governing body member or 
director 
• Appoint a manager to a local authority to 
exercise specified functions 
• Appoint a manager to an RSL to ensure 
appropriate management of affairs 
• Appointment of a person to conduct an 
inquiry into an RSL’s affairs 
• Instruct an extraordinary audit for purpose 
of an inquiry 
• Following an enquiry can direct an RSL to 
transfer its land to another RSL, and also 
declare a moratorium on creditor’s rights of 
56 days in case of insolvency 
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statutory interventions will be sanctioned unless the organisation in question has first 
been given the opportunity to remedy its own failings: 
 
We will use our statutory intervention powers only where absolutely necessary, to 
tackle specific, serious performance issues.  The most efficient way of addressing 
performance issues is for housing service providers to identify and act upon any 
such issues themselves (Communities Scotland 2004: 13). 
 
 
Direct intervention then, is to be reserved only for those organisations that will not or 
cannot adopt this active role.  It is therefore not mismanagement or underperformance per 
se that is problematised by the Regulator rather the unwillingness or inactivity of an 
organisation in addressing its shortcomings.  Devolving autonomy to local agents is 
essential to this mode of power, for it cannot realise its objectives without the consent and 
co-operation of ‘the governed’ (Dean 1999; Rose 1999).  As Foucault asserts (2003b), the 
exercise of power in this context is not the antithesis of freedom; rather it presupposes it.  
In doing so, he illuminates both the active participation of subjugated populations in their 
own government and the limits of a solely state-centred analysis of regulation.  The aim 
here it not however to downplay the role of the state in housing governance, but to 
highlight that it is only one form of government amongst many. 
 
Responsible Subjects and the Micro-Organisation of Audit 
This emphasis on local autonomy and self-governance has been paralleled by the 
responsibilisation of housing agencies.  It is no longer elected politicians, either at the 
local or national, who are solely responsible for service provision.  Accountability is now 
to be devolved to the local level and housing agencies must thrive or fail by the local 
decisions that they make.  This twin movement of autonomisation and responsibilisation 
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is central to advanced liberal technologies of governance (Rose 1999), and in the context 
of social housing, has resulted in a greater emphasis on public accountability and 
customer satisfaction.  The cyclical inspection of individual social landlords, which was 
discussed in the previous section, is central here.  As previously outlined it is a form of 
statutory action devised to evaluate and grade the performance of housing agencies 
through intensive, on-site visits.  It is through this process of external audit that 
professional expertise is to be opened up to independent scrutiny and held to account.   
When on-site, Inspection Teams can deploy a range of techniques in order to 
enable them to get a rounded picture of what each organisation is doing.  These focus on 
providing the Inspection team with first hand experience of how services are being 
delivered through ‘reality checks’, which include: estate and other site visits; area office 
visits; reviews of individual histories; observation; focus groups; and mystery shopping 
(Communities Scotland 2007).  The emphasis on experiencing services and talking to 
front-line workers to understand how they implement procedures represents a significant 
evolution in the regulation of social housing towards a more explicit customer focus. 
Whilst the formal monitoring process has been well-documented, the side-effects 
of the audit process and the perspective of ‘the auditee’ have often been neglected (Power 
2003).  A more grounded analysis focused on the voices of those subject to governing 
practices, highlights that the prospect of being job shadowed was a source of much stress 
and anxiety amongst front-line workers who described it as both “intense” and 
“intimidating”.  In contrast to the message emanating from the Regulator, shadowing was 
perceived as both an individual appraisal and scrutiny of their professionalism, with 
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many front-line workers expressing concern that they might do something wrong which 
would result in the organisation being given a bad grade: 
   
You worry a wee bit when they [the Inspectors] are coming ‘god, what if I say 
something wrong and I don’t mean to’ (RSL Housing Officer). 
 
I think staff do things as well that they just don’t realise they do and there’s that 
worry I might be the person.  Might say the wrong thing, might do the wrong 
thing.  You know what it’s like yourself when you’re doing something and 
someone’s sitting over you (LHO Policy Officer, GHA). 
 
Anxiety about the relative performance of the organisation also extended to the 
outcome of the grading process in terms of the final report and recommendations 
produced by the Inspectors.  As Table 3 illustrates, inspection grades are awarded for 
both housing management and property maintenance (and for local authorities only 
homelessness) with the grade awarded ranging on a scale from D (poor) to A (excellent).  
Important here is the extent to which RSLs are achieving The Standards, and 
demonstrating continuous improvement, legislative compliance and good practice in the 
services they deliver to tenants. 
 
Table 3 Inspection Grade Descriptions 
GRADE RATING DESCRIPTION 
A Excellent A service comprised of overall strengths, with a proven track record for 
continuous improvement.  May be weaknesses but these do not detract from 
service users’ experience or undermine the services ability to improve. 
B Good A service whereby the strengths outweigh the areas for improvement.  
Weaknesses do not significantly impact on the service users’ experience or 
undermine the services ability to improve. 
C Fair A service characterised by some strengths but with important weaknesses that 
undermine the service users’ experience or the service’s ability to improve.  
Need for structured action to remedy the situation. 
D Poor A service characterised by major weaknesses, so that whatever the strengths 
they nonetheless undermine the service user’s experience or management of 
the service.  Need for immediate remedial action. 
Source: adapted from Communities Scotland (2007) “Guide to Inspection”.  
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Grades C and D were perceived by housing professionals as “poor” and discussed 
overwhelmingly in negative terms.  They described how a low grade was a “stigma” and 
threat to the organisation’s reputation.  Not only because inspection reports were publicly 
available to tenants and other stakeholders, but as the Regulator would also require an 
action plan to remedy the situation.  More importantly, a low grade also had the added 
affect of damaging staff morale by exacerbating the feeling that the organisation was 
‘failing’: 
 
Well it can have a major impact because if you’ve got a bad grade you could get 
an appointee on your board.  That’s a real insult; you can’t run your own business.  
And private funders are looking at these things, other associations, wider action 
money as well (Member of RSL Management Team). 
 
It does have a damaging effect on morale […].  Somebody comes along and tells 
you actually you’re not doing this terribly well and you’ve been doing all this 
work and it’s not greatly appreciated.  Well that’s how it comes across.  It is quite 
damaging (Policy Officer, SFHA). 
 
 
Discussions about the grading process were also littered with references to the 
possibility of the organisation being “shut down” or having appointees to its board, thus 
reflecting the extreme prospect of statutory intervention.  Although this is a relatively rare 
phenomenon in the Scottish housing context it emphasises that the way in which the 
housing regulatory framework is constructed does has a very real impact on how housing 
associations are managed.  As highlighted in the classic work of Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992), the availability of touch sanctions is crucial to the effectiveness of the regulatory 
system.  Yet it cannot succeed on the basis of threats alone.  Audit requires the consent 
and participation of regulated organisations, for they must render themselves auditable by 
collecting and presenting evidence about their performance.  The act of making 
19  
organisations collect such comparable information is central to the way in which norms 
of performance become internalised in housing management.  As Rose and Miller (1992) 
emphasise, making people ‘write things down’ is itself a means of governing them 
because it compels them to consider and take note of certain aspects of their activities 
according to particular norms of conduct.  The effect of which, is the displacement of 
expertise by measurable targets that render the decisions of professionals “visible, 
calculable and amenable to evaluation” (Rose 1996: 351).   
Yet as Power (2003) highlights, compliance comes at a cost to the audited 
organisation.  Local housing staff described the inspection process as both demanding 
and onerous in terms of the workload involved.  From beginning to end inspection can 
last up to twenty-six weeks dependent on the size and complexity of the organisation, 
with the submission document itself, as one Inspector commented, involving a 
“significant effort” to put together.  As outlined in the Guide to Inspection it comprises 
three main parts (Communities Scotland 2007).  First, a profile of the organisation, 
including stock type and geographical distribution, governance and user involvement 
structures, and its main activities and services.  Second, key documents which can range 
to 42 in total.  Third, the organisation’s self-assessment of its own performance. 
The number of regulatory bodies that housing agencies have to answer to, and as 
such the sheer volume and repetitive nature of the submissions required was also 
identified as a burden.  For example, those organisations involved in providing additional 
care and support to their tenants or who had charitable status were also answerable to the 
Care Commission and the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator.4   For small 
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associations in particular, the staff time involved in putting together the necessary 
material for these different bodies is considerable: 
 
We came up with a very crude piece of work just trying to list the number of 
regulators […] we came up with about seventeen or eighteen at the end of the day.  
Some of those are more intense than others I mean obviously you’ve got 
Communities Scotland and the Care Commission at one end […] that’s the kind 
of intense end but you can say in a rural area you can be dealing with the Crofting 
Commission […].  And people like Revenue and Customs somewhere in the 
middle and the Tax people, and so on (Policy Officer, SFHA). 
 
Whilst interviews with members of the Regulation and Inspection team from 
Communities Scotland illustrated that they were aware of such grassroots concerns (see 
also, Communities Scotland and Accounts Commission 2001), there remains a gap 
between strategic aspirations for partnership working and protocol agreements between 
regulatory bodies, and the reality of the situation as experienced by housing practitioners. 
 
Recalcitrant ‘Subjects’ and Localised Resistance 
The role of the Regulator in evaluating performance was not however accepted 
unquestionably.  Practitioners (both front-line and external actors) were highly critical of 
the housing regulatory framework, which they described as “too intrusive” and “heavy 
handed”.  Echoing previous research by Clapham and Kintrea (2000), front-line workers 
criticised the Regulator’s focus on the “minute details” of their activities, and also its 
“obsession” with having a documented audit-trail.  One housing manager likened 
Inspection to the “fraud squad” coming in; whilst another officer ridiculed the fact their 
organisation now had over one-hundred policies and procedures in place, even for 
activities they did not engage in: 
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Things like for talking sake, where we have very sheltered housing you might 
have a policy on lifting and handling, but we don’t allow our wardens to lift and 
handle so we’ve got to have a policy to say you do not lift and handle [...].  It’s 
crazy and it’s just brought in a hell of a lot of work (RSL Housing Officer). 
 
Front-line workers perceived this emphasis on creating an auditable paper trail as a very 
narrow indicator of success, and believed that performance should be judged in terms of 
the service provided and the tangible benefits achieved for the area:  
 
They [Communities Scotland] have asked for several new policies and procedures 
to be in place and it’s a lot more paper and it’s far too much […] the proof of the 
pudding is out there.  Have a look at our area.  Look what’s going on, look at the 
ideas we are putting in place, look at the exciting innovations that we’re bringing 
in.  So we say that’s far better, although you have to try and strike a balance 
(Member of RSL Management Team). 
 
This highlights how the agendas of individual social landlords and the Regulator may not 
necessarily be in concurrence, and although outwith the scope of this paper, identifies a 
potential site of central-local tensions (for further discussion see, McKee 2008).   
Practitioners also described front-line housing management as a pressured job, 
and asserted that it was difficult to always achieve the high standards the Inspectors were 
looking for, particularly the strict adherence to organisational policies and procedures: 
 
I think the pressure is on the staff just now to try and do everything one hundred 
percent.  A paper trail that kind of thing?  Yeh, uh huh they are […].  Which is 
fine for them, but they are no in here doing it, you know that’s their job […].  You 
could be sitting doing three or four things at the one time and answering a phone 
and trying to you know, so there are a lot of different aspects [to this job] (LHO 
Housing Officer, GHA). 
 
Furthermore, such a standardised approach was deemed to undermine the autonomy and 
discretion identified as central to the professional identity of front-line workers (for 
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further discussion of professionalism, see Casey and Allen 2004).  As one housing officer 
articulated, the top-down emphasis on creating an audit-trail ran the risk of transforming 
officers into “stupid bureaucrats” motivated only by policies and procedures, and as such 
liable to make “stupid decisions” that undermined standards of service.   This underlines 
that whilst performance management may squeeze out the worst performers, it may also 
lead to dull conformity and homogeneity: 
 
There always has been a level of discretion.  I think staff are frightened now to 
use that discretion […].  I think they are frightened to skip these wee steps in case 
it comes back [to them] (LHO Policy Officer, GHA). 
  
Housing professionals are not however passive in this regulatory regime, and their 
discontent manifested itself in an array of subversive strategies to circumvent what they 
interpreted as attempts to regulate their performance.  For example, one housing manager 
described how instead of “jump(ing) through the hoops” set by the Regulator and 
devising hundreds of policies from scratch, he instead obtained copies of policies from 
other associations he was on good terms with and adapted them to suit their particular 
local situation.  Plagiarism was not unique to this case study.   
 
She [the Inspector] says ‘I want your policies on A, B, C and D you’ve not got 
them’.  It’s not because it was intentional we didn’t have them in place, we didn’t 
know or weren’t aware we had to have these things.  I said to her you tell us 
who’s got these policies and we’ll phone them up.  [She said] ‘no I want you to do 
a wee bit of leg work for this’ […].  We got the policies and we sent them off to 
her.  And to be fair we plagiarised a lot of the stuff because everybody is doing 
the same thing […].  We didn’t tell her where we got them from it was a wee bit 
deceitful I suppose (Member of RSL Management Team).   
 
 In another incident, practitioners described how it was difficult to carry out their 
job as normal when the ‘Inspectors were in’ because of the perception they should 
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minimise discretion and adhere rigidly to the organisation’s policies and procedures.  In 
response, they engaged in what one officer described as “putting on a show” for the 
purposes of the Inspectors − a show that was not necessarily in concurrence with the 
actual daily practices of the organisation or the professionals within it.  For example, one 
officer described how she did not believe in a standardised approach to tackling rent 
arrears as per the association’s policy because every tenant’s circumstances are different 
and so the approach taken also needs to be tailored:   
 
It’s not a blanket approach you can have with every tenant when it comes to rent 
and how you talk to them about it.  I think of a particular tenant who has a drink 
problem and who comes in and jokes with me and I’ll go ‘look you need to pay 
your rent’ and that’s the way I speak to him ‘you’re going to end up loosing your 
house’ and I kind of laugh and he goes ‘I don’t care I’ll sleep in the closes 
hen’[…].  And I said to [another housing officer] how would I speak to that 
[tenant during the Inspection]?  Because [the Inspector] doesn’t have that 
background, that knowledge.  I said to her I’d maybe tone it down a wee bit, it’s 
no a bad thing I’m doing.  He likes the way I speak to him (RSL Housing 
Officer). 
 
 
The ability to build a rapport with clients and adapt the rules to provide a personal service 
is central to the professional identity of front-line workers (Casey and Allen 2004).   Yet 
this commitment to a personalised local service was hidden during the on-site visit, where 
the emphasis was very much on demonstrating that policies and procedures were being 
routinely implemented in practice.   
The Regulator’s efforts to shape the performance of housing agencies, and 
therefore the professionals within them, was therefore not accepted unquestionably but 
actively resisted and contested.  In this context, resistance is not understood as liberation 
from oppression, rather as an alternative political strategy that challenges and adapts 
current governing practices.  As Foucault (2003b) emphasises ‘subjects’ are not passive 
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and on the receiving end of power; rather they are autonomous actors capable of thinking 
and acting otherwise.  Consequently, power’s effects cannot be guaranteed.  When power 
calls people may “ignore it, refuse to listen, or tune in to alternative hailings that speak of 
different selves, imagined collectivities and futures” (Clarke 2004: 12).  Yet these 
“subjects of doubt” have too often been neglected in governmentality studies where the 
dominant tendency has been to focus on political rationalities or ‘mentalities’ of rule 
(Clarke 2004: 1; see also McKee, In Press).  Whilst this paper has endeavoured to give 
greater attention to the experiences of subjugated populations, in this instance housing 
practitioners, it nonetheless remains a field of study that requires further exploration.5  
 
Conclusion 
The emergence of ‘technologies of performance’ within UK social housing management 
reflects wider shifts in the reconstruction of public services (Dean 1999; Rose 1999; 
Miller and Rose 2008).  As the empirical data on housing governance in Scotland 
highlights, there has been a departure from top-down hierarchical control towards an 
emphasis on the critical self-assessment and responsible self-governance of social 
landlords.  Evaluation, comparison and punitive interventions for ‘failing’ organisations 
are however simultaneously key components of these ‘technologies of performance’, for 
it is through external audit that professional expertise is to be opened up to independent 
scrutiny and held to account.  Here, governmentality opens up a critical space to explore 
the subtle interplay between these voluntary and coercive modes of power.  In doing so, it 
transcends the limits of a solely state-based analysis of regulation by illuminating the 
active role of ‘subjects’ in their own governance.   
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 In addition, the empirical data emphasises the costs of compliance for regulated 
organisations and the frustration of housing practitioners with the regulatory system.  
Front-line workers are however not passive in all of this.  Indeed, they devised a number 
of strategies to undermine the Regulator’s attempts to govern their performance.  This 
ranged from the housing manager who attempted to satisfy the Regulator’s desire for 
written policies by plagiarising them from other associations, to the housing officer who 
“put on a show” for the Inspector to mask the flexible and adaptive nature of her practice.  
These examples underline the centrality of ‘recalcitrance of will’ to a Foucauldian 
analysis, and also caution against conceptualising liberation and domination in diametric 
opposition.  Resistance in this context is not understood as liberation from oppression; 
rather a means of illuminating the varied ways in which subjugated populations have 
contested, challenged and adapted governing strategies aimed at regulating their conduct. 
 In conclusion, governmentality has much to offer the housing studies tradition.  
By drawing attention to governing beyond the state, especially the way in which 
‘governable subjects’ are intimately involved in their own government it offers a 
sophisticated and nuanced analysis of power and rule at the micro-level.  Further research 
on localised resistance is however needed in order to fully exploit the intellectual 
apparatus that we, as critical scholars, have inherited from Foucault.5 
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End Notes 
1
 In the 25 years between 1981 and 2006, public sector housing fell from 29 to 10 percent 
of all dwellings in the UK.  During the same period the housing association sector grew 
from 2 to 8 percent (Wilcox 2000: 103). 
2 Local Housing Organisations (LHO) are unique to the Glasgow stock transfer context.  
Whilst Glasgow Housing Association is the transfer association, since its inception in 
2003 it has devolved day-to-day housing management activities to the city’s LHO 
network.  These organisations are community based, small in scale and governed by a 
management committee comprising a majority of local tenants (McKee 2007). 
3 It is too early to tell whether the regulatory regime will change significantly under the 
new Regular, but early indicators suggest similar governmental strategies and techniques 
will be pursued (Scottish Housing Regulator 2008). 
4 The Scottish Commission for the Regulation of Care regulates those organisations that 
provide care services, such as sheltered and very sheltered housing, whilst the Office of 
the Scottish Charity Regulator regulates the activities of charitable organisations 
including some housing associations or co-operatives within the voluntary sector. 
5 The issue of front-line resistance was not the explicit focus of this research; rather it 
emerged as an interesting and somewhat unexpected side-issue. 
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